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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the relative importance of fundamental and speculative de-
mand on oil futures price levels and volatility. In a rst step, we present a theoretical
heterogeneous agent model of the oil futures market based on noise trading. We use the
model to study the interaction between the oil futures price, volatility, developments in
underlying fundamentals and the presence of dierent types of agents. We distinguish be-
tween commercial traders (who are physically involved in oil) and non-commercial traders
(who are not involved physically with oil). Based on the theoretical model we nd that
a multiplicity of equilibria can exist. More specically, on the one hand, if we have high
fundamental volatility, high uncertainty about future oil demand, and the oil price devia-
tion from fundamentals or the price trend is small, we will only have commercial traders
entering the market. On the other hand, if a large unexpected shock to the oil spot price
occurs then all traders will enter the market. In a next step, we empirically test the model
by estimating a markov-switching model with time-varying transition probabilities. We
estimate the model over the period January 1992 - April 2011. We nd that up to 2004,
movements in oil futures prices are best explained by underlying fundamentals. However,
since 2004 regime switching has become more frequent and the chartist regime has been
the most prominent.
J.E.L. classication: D84, Q33, Q41, G15.
Keywords: Markov switching models, oil prices, speculation.5
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Non-technical summary
The importance of oil to the modern world is unique in character and far-reaching in scope.
It is a singularly autonomous variable in the world economy and it is used inter alia for trans-
portation, heating and production. As such, oil availability and prices thus aect the global
output capacity, rate of growth and level of in ation and hence oil price  uctuations can
have important macroeconomic repercussions. Indeed, sharply higher oil prices can set di!-
cult economic challenges for oil importing economies as it can simultaneously slow economic
growth while stoking in ation. For these reasons, already almost a century ago, academics
started to study oil prices (see for instance Working, 1948).
During the eighties and nineties, however, interest in understanding oil price developments
fell mainly because prices remained relatively low and stable in nominal and real terms. How-
ever, since 2000, interest in oil price developments resurfaced as prices started to experience a
steady upward trend. Since 2005, this upward movement became more rapid and then, in the
course of 2008, oil prices climbed to unprecedented highs of USD 140 per barrel in July, only
to fall dramatically in a very short period of time to a low of US 40 per barrel in December
2008. Since the end of 2008, oil prices have picked up again.
Such relatively dramatic and unprecedented movements in oil prices have reignited interest
into the question as to what drives oil prices. The recent academic and policy debate seems
to put forward several possible factors however no consensus seems to arise as to the relative
importance of these factors. In particular, there is no consensus as to the relative weight that
should be attributed to speculation versus (i.e. supply and demand) fundamentals in driving
oil prices.
In this paper we analyse the relative importance of fundamental and speculation driven
demand on oil futures price levels and volatility. In a rst step, we present a theoretical het-
erogeneous agent model of the oil futures market based on "noise trading". We use the model
to study the interaction between prices, volatility, developments in underlying fundamentals
and the presence of dierent types of agents. We distinguish between commercial traders (who
are physically involved in oil) and non-commercial traders (who are not involved physically
with oil). Based on the theoretical model we nd that a multiplicity of equilibria can exist.
More specically, on the one hand, if we have high fundamental volatility, high uncertainty
about future oil demand, and the oil price deviation from fundamentals or the price trend
is small, we will only have commercial traders entering the market. On the other hand, if
a large unexpected shock to the oil spot price occurs then all traders will enter the market.
Under this circumstance, the oil price variance reaches its maximum and the oil price itself
is a weighted average of the pricing rules applied by the dierent traders. Important in this
respect is also that increasing the number of commercial traders decreases the benets for the
non-commercial traders to enter the market. In a next step in the paper, we empirically test
the model by estimating a markov-switching model with time-varying transition probabilities.
We estimate the model over the period January 1992 - April 2011. We nd that for the earlier
part of our sample (up to 2004) that fundamentals have been the key driving force behind
oil price movements. Thereafter, trend chasing patterns appear to be better in capturing the
developments in oil futures markets.6
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1 Introduction and literature review
The importance of oil to the modern world is unique in character and far-reaching in scope.
It is a singularly autonomous variable in the world economy and it is used inter alia for trans-
portation, heating and production. As such, oil availability and prices thus aect the global
output capacity, rate of growth and level of in ation and hence oil price  uctuations can
have important macroeconomic repercussions. Indeed, sharply higher oil prices can set di!-
cult economic challenges for oil importing economies as it can simultaneously slow economic
growth while stoking in ation. For these reasons, already almost a century ago, academics
started to study oil prices (see for instance Working, 1934).
During the eighties and nineties, however, interest in understanding oil price developments
fell mainly because prices remained relatively low and stable in nominal and real terms (see
Figure 1). However, since 2000, interest in oil price developments resurfaced as prices started
to experience a steady upward trend. Since 2005, this upward movement became more rapid
and then, in the course of 2008, oil prices climbed to unprecedented highs of almost USD 140
per barrel in July, only to fall dramatically in a very short period of time to a low of US 40
per barrel in December 2008. Since the end of 2008, oil prices have picked up again.









Nominal WTI oil price (in USD)








Real WTI oil price (US CPI deflated, Jan 2002 = 100)
Figure 1: Monthly oil price developments over the period 1959-2011
Such relatively dramatic and unprecedented movements in oil prices have reignited interest7
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into the question as to what drives oil prices. The recent academic and policy debate seems
to put - next to the geopolitical factor - forward three main possible factors which may have
caused the upward movement in oil prices, however no consensus seems to arise as to the
relative importance of these factors.
First, some authors note that fundamentals and more specically increased demand from
fast growing developing countries - which are accounting for larger and larger shares of annual
oil consumption growth - are playing an important role (see for instance Helbling and others
(2008)). While some large developing countries have been growing rapidly for years, and in
some cases decades, a combination of rapid industrialization and higher commodity intensity
of growth, coupled with rapid income per capita growth, has increased signicantly their oil
demand.
Second, Calvo (2008) argues that excess liquidity and low interest rates have been con-
tributing to the price increases. Low interest rates would result in the expansion of money
supply. They would also decrease the demand for liquid assets by sovereigns like China, Chile
or Dubai. Both eects would eventually lead to an increase in prices. But not all prices would
m o v ea tt h es a m et i m ea ss o m ep r i c e sa r em o r e exible than others. Among the most  exible,
according to Calvo (2008), are the commodity prices. A similar argument has been made by
Frankel (2005, 2006).
Finally, in additional to these more fundamental based explanations, some studies have
noted that speculation may also be behind the upward movement in commodity prices. The
role of speculators in futures markets has been the always been a source of both interest and
controversy recent years. The traditional speculative stabilizing theory of Friedman (1953)
suggests that protable speculation must involve buying when the price is low and selling
when the price is high. The traditional theory predicts that irrational speculators or noise
traders, who trade on the basis of irrelevant information, will not survive in the market
place. Such view is for instance conrmed in Lombardi and Van Robays (2011) who nd
that speculative trading in futures markets may aect spot oil prices signicantly, but their
overall importance is limited over time. Such views are however being challenged by theories
of noise trading, herding behaviour and speculative bubbles. Shleifer and Summers (1990)
and deLong et al. (1990) for instance show that noise traders might have an impact on
prices if they hold large share of assets regardless of their survival in the long run. Such
views have gained increasing prominence, due to the coincident rise in crude oil prices and
the increased numbers of nancial participants in the crude oil futures market from 2000-
2008. Indeed, over the last decade, the volume of trading in nancial instruments linked to
oil (and in general commodities) has increased sharply on both commodity exchanges and
over-the-counter markets. For instance, the open futures positions held by nancial traders
(hedge funds and non-registered participants) grew sharply — from about 45,000 contracts in
the second half of 2000, to more than half a million futures in the rst eight months of 2008.
As a result, the market share of nancial traders has more than doubled, from less than 20%
of all open futures and futures-equivalent option positions in 2000 to more than 40% in 2008.
However, one of the counter arguments that recently prices re ect fundamentals rather than
speculation is the question "W h e r ea r et h es t o c k s ? " (see Krugman, 2008). Along this line
of argumentation, if speculators were the main force pushing oil prices far above the level
justied by fundamentals, excess supply should be observed.
Taken together, the recent literature points towards several factors which may have driven
oil prices upwards. However, at the same time, the literature remains inconclusive as to the
relative importance of these factors. In particular, there is no consensus as to the relative8
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weight that should be attributed to speculation versus (i.e. supply and demand) fundamentals
in driving oil prices.
Of course alternatively, it could be asserted that both stories overlap and are connected
and that a complete picture should take all the pieces together in a coherent way. As such,
both nancialization and rising demand from emerging markets (i.e. fundamentals) could
have played a role in the recent oil price movements. On this basis, we could argue that there
are several agents active in the market with dierent beliefs or strategies. Their interaction
determines the price formation in the market. In previous studies, such models have been
successfully applied to a variety of markets. Shiller (1984) was the r s tt oe s t i m a t es u c ha
model for the money market whereas deLong et al. (1990) developed a model of the asset
markets in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs aect prices. The
approach has however been most widely adopted to model the exchange rate market (see
for instance among others De Grauwe, Dewachter and Embrechts (1993), Menkho et al.
(2009) and Jeanne and Rose (2002)). In our case, we intend to apply this theoretical model
to the crude oil futures market and then test the model empirically using a time-varying
transition probability Markov-switching model. We decide to apply the model to the crude
oil futures market and not the spot market as agents who are not physically involved in
oil can enter the oil futures market but are less likely to enter the spot market. Indeed,
contracts sold on futures markets generally do not require the purchaser to take delivery of
the oil, and can be implemented immediately with little up-front cash (Silvapulle and Moosa,
1999). As such, these contracts are specically designed to be nancial instruments (Energy
Information Agency, 2008). In addition, Newberry (1992) argues that futures markets provide
opportunities for price manipulation (see Kaufman and Ullman, 2009).
By analysing the potential non-linear link between oil futures prices and its fundamentals,
this paper ts into several strands of the nance and commodities literature.
In the literature on commodities, our analysis contributes to determining the link between
the futures price of oil and oil price fundamentals. In theory, futures prices should be equal to
the spot price plus the cost of carry (the sum of the cost of storage and the interest rate) and
the convenience yield (that is, the benet from holding spot oil which accrues to the owner
of the spot commodity). Since the study of Garbade and Silver (1983), a widely recognised
benet of futures markets has been the process of competitive price discovery, that is the
use of futures prices for pricing spot market transactions through the timely incorporation
into market prices of heterogeneous private information or heterogeneous interpretation of
public information by way of trading activity (Lehmann, 2002). Nevertheless, emprically, the
determination of the convenience yield and the role of futures prices in the price discovery
process remains unconclusive.
In nance, our analysis adds to extant work on the roles of dierent kinds of traders in
nancial markets. The evidence of the presence of noise traders in nancial markets is well
documented. For instance, a survey conducted by the Group of Thirty (1985) reported that
87% of security houses believed that the use of technical analysis has a signicant impact
on the foreign exchange market. In the case of commodity markets, evidence also starts to
emerge of the use of chartist trading techniques. In this context, for instance Smidt (1965)
reports that a large fraction of the speculators applies price charts to render trading decisions
in commodity markets. Similar results are obtained by Draper (1985) and Canoles (1998).
Furthermore, Sanders et al. (2000) discern evidence of positive feedback grading in several
commodity markets and Weiner (2002) detects evidence of herding behaviour in the petroleum
market.9
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In terms of approach, our paper is closest to Reitz and Slopek (2008) and Ter Ellen
and Zwinkels (2010). In the rst study, the authors develop and empirically investigate a
simple oil market model with technical and fundamental traders. Technical traders form
price predictions by extrapolating historical price trends thereby destabilizing the market.
Fundamental analysis is based on the assumption that prices converge towards their long-run
equilibrium value. To do so, the authors estimate a smooth transition autoregressive model.
The results suggest that heterogeneous agents and their nonlinear trading impact may be
responsible for pronounced swings in oil prices, as witnessed in recent years. In Ter Ellen
and Zwinkels (2010) the authors assert that fundamentalists have a demand for oil based on
the dierence between the spot price and the expected price of oil in the future. Chartists
have a simpler approach: they react to the price change. Chartists expect trend movements
to continue in the same direction irrespective of fundamentals. Total market demand for
oil consists of the real demand for oil – the users of oil – and the weighted average of
the demand of the chartists and the fundamentalists. Their results suggest that typically,
fundamentalists are 40% to 70% of the market; however in 2008, they fell to about 35% of the
market. When chartists dominated the market – in 1985-1986, 1990, and in 1998 – price
changes were particularly pronounced.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a theoretical
model of heterogeneous agents. Then in section 3 we present the empirical markov-switching
model that we will estimate. Finally, in Section 3.3 we discuss the data and the estimation
results.
2 A Small Model of Heterogeneous Agents and the oil futures
market
The model presented in this section mixes elements from two hitherto disparate branches
of the theory of oil price determination and the noise trading approach to asset price and
volatility determination. On the oil price theory side, we use the conventional model of oil
futures price determination, as developed by Kaldor (1939) and rened by Pindyck (1994).
On the microstructure side, we employ the model of noise trading developed by deLong et al.
(1990) and rened by Sanders et al. (1999) for the futures market.
2.1 A fundamental-based model of oil futures prices
The literature on determining the commodity futures prices dates back to the Theory of Nor-
mal Backwardation introduced by Keynes (1930), which compares futures prices to expected
future spot prices. This theory is based on a denition of the basis, i.e. the dierence be-
tween the current futures price maturing at time T (Iw>W) and the current spot price (Vw).
The theory divides the basis into the dierence between the spot price expected to prevail at
time W (HwV(W)) and the current spot prices (Vw) minus a risk premium (w>W):
Iw>W  Vw = Hw (VW)  Vw  w>W
In its earliest form, the Theory of Normal Backwardation asserts that in order to induce
storage, futures prices and expected spot prices have to rise over time to compensate storage
holders for the costs of storage. This cost of carry principle, however, had di!culties to
explain downward sloping futures curves.10
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In response, Kaldor (1939) introduced the Theory of Storage. The Theory of Storage
established a link between contemporaneous spot and futures prices and recties the Theory of
Normal Backwardation by introducing the concept of convenience yield. The convenience yield
can be dened as the implicit gain that accrues to an owner of the physical commodity but not
to the owner of a contract for future delivery of the commodity (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985).
These additional benets include production smoothing (Kaldor, 1939, and Working, 1948)1,
as well as the option value of holding inventories (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).2 In the specic
case of the crude oil market, the convenience yield turns out to be particularly relevant, not
only because of the strategic benet from the possession of the commodity, but also because
of the relative scarcity of that non-renewable resource (Coppola, 2008). Under the cost of
storage model and in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the relationship between futures
and spot prices can be described as follows:
Iw>W = Vw +( W  w)uw  #w>W
Pindyck (1994) then in turn expressed the net convenience yield (#w>W) as a function of
t h es p o tp r i c e ,t h el e v e lo fi n v e n t o r i e s( Qw) and expected oil demand (Tw+1):
#w>W = #(Qw>T w+1>V w)
The net marginal convenience yield is assumed to be negatively correlated with the level
of inventory. Indeed, at times of higher inventories, adding an additional unit is expected
to yield less benet. At the same time, it is positively related to the spot price and higher
expected oil demand since in both cases the convenience of holding inventories increases.
2.2 The Microstructural Set-up of the Trading Behaviour
On the microstructure side, the model presented in this paper is in essence a stripped down
version of Samuelson’s (1958) overlapping generations model with two-period lived agents
who allocate their portfolio between the risk free asset (which is in perfect elastic supply)
and oil futures contracts. As in deLong et al. (1990) we assume that there is no rst period
consumption, no labour supply decision and no bequest. As a result, the resources the agents
in the model have to invest are exogenous. The only decision agents have to make is to choose
a portfolio when young. Traders have the same endownments but dier in their ability to
trade in the oil futures and spot market. We will distinguish between two main types of
agents: commercial and non-commercial agents.
Commercial agents are physically involved in the oil market. They supply and consume oil
and are able to store it. These agents are able to trade on the oil spot market and only enter
in the futures market as they wish to hedge against price  uctuations by xing in advance the
price they wil have to pay or receive for a delivery in the future. In the case of oil producers,
entering in the futures market ensures that they have the opportunity to secure their income
today by selling futures contracts, whilst oil consumers will buy futures contracts in order to
pin down their future costs. These traders are able to form rational expectations on risk and
returns costlessly.
1There are costs to rms from rapidly shifting production and from rapid shifts (especially declines) in
inventory holdings. Additional inventories oer the rm added  exibility to produce at the time that minimizes
costs, by reducing the risk of stockouts.
2In eect, an option value exists because inventories allow the  exibility to choose the most protable time
to sell the commodity.11
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Non-commercial agents are, in contrast to commercial agents, not physically involved with
oil. They intervene in the oil futures market because they want to achieve exposure to oil price
risk. While commercial agents can enter the oil futures markets costlessly, non-commercial
agents face an entry costs. Moreover, non-commercial agents have only imperfect information
regarding the evolution of oil price fundamentals. In addition, while some base their expec-
tations about future prices on the perceived evolution of market fundamentals others not do
not take market fundamentals into account but instead base their expectations about future
prices and their trading strategies upon observed historical patterns in past prices. These
technical analysts try to extrapolate observed price patterns, such as trends, and exploit
these patterns in their investment decisions. Allen and Tailor (1989) describe the distinction
as follows: chartists study only the price action of a market, whereas fundamentalists look for
the reason behind that action.3
As in DeLong et al. (1990) we assume a generation of traders is born each period. We as-
sume that commercial traders are present in the model in measure Q1 whereas non-commercial
traders who based their expectations about future prices on market fundamentals are present
in measure Q2= Finally, non-commercial traders who base their expectations upon historical
patterns are presented in measure Q3. Each trader decides upon the share of its endowment
(Z)i tw i s h e st oi n v e s ti nt h eo i lm a r k e ta tt i m et( e
m
w). The remainder will be invested
at the risk free interest rate u. The decision are taken before time w shocks are revealed,
on the basis of the information available at time w  1= Each agent has a constant absolute
risk aversion utility function: X = exp3dHw(Zw+1) where d is the constant absolute risk
aversion. Traders aim to maximise the expected utility of their end-of-life wealth (Zw+1).
With normally-distributed returns to holding an oil futures contract, this is equivalent to
maximising Hw(X)=Hw(Zw+1)  2d2
Hw(Zw+1). End-of-life wealth of trader j (Z
m








ww+1  Fm) (1)
Trader m’s end-of-life wealth is thus equal to the trader’s initial endowment times the risk free
interest rate plus, if m enters, the excess return on the oil futures market investment (w+1)
minus a x e dc o s tt h a tm u s tb eb o r n et oe n t e rt h em a r k e t .Fm re ects the costs associated
with entering the market for trader m.4
As noted above, we assume there are three types of traders. Commercial traders are
assumed to have an accurate knowledge of the way the oil futures price is determined and
bear no entry cost. They are knowledgeable about the oil market, can process new information
costlessly and make their decisions based on rational expectations about the future. For these
set of traders, the expected excess return on the oil futures market investment can be written
3Albeit to some extent arbitrary to divide the traders in the oil market into dierent types of people (i.e.
rational versus irrational, well- versus ill-informed,...) such categorisation can however be justied on the basis
of two grounds. First, some traders in the oil market are indeed better informed than other. This is for instance
the basis of research in the recently increasingly popular market microstructure literature. Secondly, although
we here assume the presence of dierent trader types in the oil market, our model could also be interpreted
as one where there is one trader present in the market who weighs the dierent information sets available (i.e.
technical versus fundamental information). An alternative set-up to the one presented in this section can be
found for instance in the De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2004) for the exchange rate market.
4For simplicity we assume here that the costs do not dier according to the type of non-commercial trader
that enters the market. The model could however easily be modied to include dierent entry costs for dierent
types of non-commercial traders.12
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Non-commercial traders, in contrast to commercial traders, have imperfect knowledge
of the determinants of oil prices and are also faced with a positive entry cost. For non-
commercial traders which base their predictions about oil prices upon market fundamentals,
we adopt the assumption, akin to DeLong et al. (1990) that the perception of future oil
demand is aected by noise unrelated to fundamentals. This noise is common among all non-
commercial fundamental traders (i.e. we assume that among non-commercial traders there is
no private information). For these traders we can then write:
H
m





whereby w represents the extent to which non-commercial fundamental traders misper-
ceive the distribution of expected oil demand. The misperception is represented by an i.i.d
normal variable, i.e. w˜Q(W>2
w) and is assumed to be uncorrelated with oil fundamentals.
We interpret the noise terms as a fad which is wide-spread but non-fundamentals. In addition,
we link the size of the non-commercial traders ’ errors to economic uncertainty by assuming
that the variance of the noise is proportional to the true unconditional variance of the oil
futures price, i.e. 2
w = 2
Iw>w+1 with A1.
Finally, the last set of non-commercial traders base their expectations about future oil









Based on these expected returns, we can determine the optimal share each trader will
invest in the oil futures market (assuming rational bahviour of all active traders). We can
then derive a market entry condition for each non-commercial trader.
















This three equation system can be solved for an oil futures pricing formula:






[Vw  Iw31>1] (2)13
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The above equations would suggest that noise trader sentiment impacts the pricing of oil
futures contracts. The rst term (in square brackets) in equation (2) indicates that the futures
price equals the fundamental value, in the absence of non-commercial traders. The second and
third term capture the price pressure eects of non-commercial traders. If fundamental non-
commercial traders are on average bearish regarding future demand, then the price is lower
than the fundamnetal value. Similarly when the past trends are be below the fundamental
based outlook, prices would be pushed below the fundamental value. However, unlike the
model of DeLong (1990) but in line with Irwin et al. (1997) we nd that non-commercial
traders cannot create their own space in futures market. That is, there is no premium for
assuming noise trader risk in futures markets. This stems from the fact that the investment
in futures is really just a side bet on price movements, and therefore, requires no net risk
sharing capacity within the economy (see Irwin, 1997). As regards the futures price volatility,
we nd that volatility is unambiguously increasing with the number of noise traders and the
variability of their sentiment (equation (3)).
In a next step, we can endogenise the composition of the pool of active traders. The entry
decision of traders that do not bear any entry cost (i.e. the commercial traders) is trivial:
they always enter the market in equilibrium. However, a non-commercial trader only enters
if the benet of diversifying the portfolio exceeds the entry cost. For non-commercial traders,
this is the case if the gross benet exceeds the costs F.T h eg r o s sb e n e ts for fundamental





































































The partial derivatives of the gross benete q u a t i o n s( 4 )a n d( 5 )h a v ea ni n t u i t i v ei n -
terpretation. The benet of entry for a marginal non-commercial trader increases with the
expected deviation of oil price from its underlying fundamentals or from its historical trend
and decreases with the oil futures price variability. The partial derivatives in this case show
that the further the oil price deviates from its fundamentals, the more non-commercial fun-
damental traders will be willing to enter the market, while increases in the oil price trend will
attract non-commercial chartist traders. However, in equilibrium both the risk premium and
the variance of the oil price are functions of the number of non-commercial traders that enter14
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the market. This circularity is responsible for the multiple equilibria. The multiplicity of
equilibria in the model is illustrated in Figure 2 which shows the gross beneﬁt and cost of en-
try for the marginal non-commercial fundamental trader for various input values.5 The entry
of the marginal non-commercial fundamental traders depends on the cost, the share of share
of non-commercial and commercial traders present in the market, the degree of uncertainty
regarding future demand expectations as well as the impact this has on oil price variability
and the expected oil price.






The gross benefit and cost of entry for low (red line) and high (blue line) values for lambda






The gross benefit and cost of entry for low (red line) and high (blue line) values for oil fundamental volatility






The gross benefit and cost of entry for low (red line) and high (blue line) values for the expected excess return
Figure 2: The gross beneﬁt and cost of entry for the marginal non-commercial fundamental
trader with the number of non-commercial fundamental traders ranging between 0 and 1.
Overall, the results would indicate that in case we have high fundamental volatility, high
uncertainty about future oil demand, and the oil price deviation from fundamentals or the
price trend is small, we will only have commercial traders entering the market (as represented
for instance by the blue lines in the two top charts in Figure 2 and the red line in the bottom
chart). If, however, a large unexpected shock to the oil spot price occurs or uncertainty
decreases about future oil demand (see top chart in Figure 2), non-commercial traders with
5All model derived charts are based on the following parameter assumptions:  =1 4, 3 =0 , 
2
 =1 .
The low value scenarios are based on the following parameters:  =1 , 
2
 =0 5 and ( − −1)=0 5.T h e
high value scenarios are based on the following parameters:  =4 , 
2
 =2and ( − −1)=0 7.15
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enter the market. Under this circumstance, the oil futures price variance will increase and
the oil futures price itself is a weighted average of the various forecasting rules. In this case,
oil futures price volatility exceeds that of its underlying fundamentals. This increase in oil
futures price volatility will reduce the gross benet for a marginal non-commercial trader to
enter the market.
Finally, equilibria in between these two extrema exist. Important in this respect is to note
that increasing the number of chartist noise traders decreases the benets for the fundamen-
talist noise traders to enter (and vice versa). This is shown in Figure 3.







Number of commercial traders
The impact of the changing number of commercial traders on the GB for a non-com. fundamental trader







Number of non-commercial chartist traders
The impact of the changing number of non-com. chartist traders on the GB for a non-com. fundamental trader
Changing non-com. chartist traders
Changing commercial traders
Figure 3: The impact of changing the number of commercial (above) or non-commercial
chartist traders (below) on the gross benet for commercial fundamental traders to enter the
market.
3 Empirically Modelling strategy: the Markov-switching model
3.1 The time-varying transition probability markov-switching model
The model presented in section 2 can generate multiple equilibria. These equilibria depend on
the number of non-commercial traders that enter the oil futures market. If they are present,16
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they increase oil price rate volatility and aect oil price rate movements. If they are absent
from the market, oil futures price movements can be explained by developments in underlying
fundamentals as commercial traders dominate the market. Which factors drive the oil futures
price at each moment in time thus depends on the share of non-commercial traders present
in the oil futures market. The presence of non-commercial traders in turn depends on the
net entry benet for the marginal non-commercial trader to enter into the oil futures market.
This is according to equations (4) and (5) a function of the number of non-commercial traders
present in the market, the deviation of the oil futures price from its fundamentals and/or from
its trend and the volatility of the underlying fundamentals. To test these model assumptions
and outcomes empirically, we rely on a 2-regime Markov-switching model with time-varying
transition probabilities. Such a model is closest to the spirit of the theoretical model.
Markov-switching models represent time series models with a latent variable component
where an unobserved Markov process drives the observation-generating distribution. Such
models have been rst applied to economics and nancial econometrics after the seminal work
of Hamilton (1989). There exists a number of extensions made to the basic Markov-switching
model as developed by Hamilton (1989), one being the time-varying transition probability
Markov-switching model. In this variant, transition probabilities are allowed to vary with
such information variables as the strength of the economy, deviations of fundamentals from
actual values, and other leading indicators of change. Examples of these extensions show
up in many elds of research. Researchers have used time-varying transition probability
models to examine output seasonality in a time-varying transition probability model (see
Ghysels, 1994), to study business cycle  uctuations (Filardo, 1994), interest rate dynamics
(Gray, 1996), bubbles and asset pricing (Schaller and van Norden 1996), and exchange rates
(Diebold, et.al. 1994, Engel and Hakkio 1994).
In our set-up, we allow for two regimes. In one regime, henceforth called the commercial
trader regime (frp), oil futures prices are a function of a set of underlying fundamentals. In
the other regime, called the non-commercial trader regime (qrqfrp), oil futures prices are a
function of historical price movements. At each moment in time, the Markov-switching model
will give us the probability of being in either of the two regimes. This probability can then be
seen as the weight placed on the commercial/non-commercial trader oil price forecast. The
transition probabilities, i.e. the probability of being in a regime in the current period given
the previous period’s regime, are allowed to be time-varying in our case and take a logstical
functional form, namely:
S(Vw = frp|Vw31 = frp)=
h(s0+s1Yw)
1+h(s0+s1Yw) (6)
S(Vw = qrqfrp|Vw31 = qrqfrp)=
h(t0+t1Zw)
1+h(t0+t1Zw)
The transition probabilities are in our model a function of the variables driving the entry
benet for the marginal non-commercial trader, as specied in equation (4) and (5).
3.2 Oil prices modelled as a TVTP Markov-switching model
In order to estimate the Markov-switching model, we rst need to specify the equations we
will estimate under the two regimes. As regards the fundamental model, as noted in section17
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2, in theory, oil futures prices can under the cost of storage model be represented as follows:
Iw>W = Vw +( W  w)uw  #w>W
Whereby #w>W is the net convenience yield. In our empirical model, we will incorporate the
net convenience yield as a function of the spot price, the level of inventories (Qw) and expected
oil demand (Tw+1) (see Pindyck, 1994). As a result, the theoretical model will empirically
translate into the following equation:
Iw>W = 0 + 1(Vw)+2uw>W + 3Hw(Tw+1)+4Qw + %w (7)
As regards the chartist, trend-chasing model, we will set up a model that has the highest
performance (out-of-sample) over our sample period. We estimated this model by a general-
to-specic approach and end up with the following specication
Iw>W = 0 + 1Iw31>W31 + 2DWw31 + 3TPDw31 + 4wuhqg + yw (8)
Whereby oil futures prices are a function of its own lag, the one-period lagged annual trend
(DWw31 =
(Iw31>W313Iw313>W313)
12 ), the one-period lagged quarterly moving average (TPDw31 =
(Iw31>W31+Iw32>W32+Iw33>W33)
3 ) and the trend since the beginning of the sample period.
Take together, we will thus estimate the following measurement equations
1:Iw>W = 0 + 1(Vw)+2uw>W + 3Hw(Tw+1)+4Qw + %w %w  Q(0>2
ixqg>w) (9)
2:Iw>W = 0 + 1Iw31>W31 + 2DWw31 + 3TPDw31 + 4wuhqg + yw yw  Q(0>2
fkduw>w)
As regards the volatility, we would expect, based on section 2, that the volatility regimes
accompanying these mean regimes should have the property that: 2
uhjlph 1 ? 2
uhjlph 2
Besides modelling the two regime equations, we also need to model the determinants of the
transition probabilities, i.e. Yw and Zw in equation 6. In our case, these information variables
are determined by the net entry benet for the marginal non-commercial trader, namely the
deviation of oil futures price from its trend and the amount of non-commercial traders present
in the market (VSHF). Based on our theoretical model, we would expect the probability of
remaining in the non-commercial trader regime is positively related to both variables. For the
commercial trader regime (or fundamental-based regime) we would expect the probability of
not switching regime to increase if oil prices deviate further from underlying fundamentals and
fundamental volatility (yro_ixqg)i sh i g h .B a s e do ne q u a t i o n s( 4 )a n d( 5 )w ew o u l de x p e c t
that the deviation of oil futures prices from trend and the deviation from fundamentals enter
the equation squared (implying that a positive or negative deviation would trigger the same
eect). We would thus get the following equations for Yw and Zw:.
Yw = d1 × yro_ixqg+ d2 × (%w31)2 (10)
Zw = d3 × vshf + d4 × (yw31)2
Ex-ante we would expect all coe!cients to have a positive sign.
A number of methods have been used to estimate this model. A standard approach is to
use both conditional maximum likelihood estimation and ltering methods (as for instance in
Gray, 1996). However, the conditions that justify this approach are non-trivial. In general,18
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the ]w variables that enter the transition probability functions must be contemporaneously
conditionally uncorrelated with the unobserved state Vw. If this condition is not met in a
particular empirical application, other methods need to be employed to deliver estimators
with the typical desirable properties (see Filardo, 1998). One such alternative method is
presented in Filardo and Gordon (1998) where a Bayesian method is adopted, using the
simulation estimation techniques of Gibbs sampling. This approach has also been adopted in
this paper. In the next section, we discuss the data used for our estimation and thereafter
the estimation results.
3.3 Data
In order to analyse the above presented model, we need to choose the relevant variables. The
rst key variable in this context is what futures price of oil should be analysed? There exist
several references in world exchanges: North Sea Brent, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and
Dubai. Each refers to an oil of high quality with a specic production or trading location. The
WTI and Dubai prices are chie y traded in the United States and Asia, whereas the North
Sea Brent is often used as the world reference. In the London based ICE futures exchange
(formerly known as the international petroleum exchange, or IPE) the Brent is used to specify
the price of two thirds of crude oil exchanged worldwide. However, although the three prices
do not  uctuate perfectly in line with one another over time, they are strongly correlated
and modelling one or the other should not impact substantially the analysis. Fattouh (2007)
in this context compares their dynamics and concludes that most varieties cointegrate in
threshold models. The Brent-WTI price dierentials is stationary with no need for thresholds
(see also Chevillon and Ri"art, 2008).
In this paper, we will rely on the WTI futures price of oil for the analysis. The main
reason is that the index used to measure speculative activity (see below) uses CFTC data,
which is based on trading activity in the WTI futures market. Our empirical analysis is based
on daily prices of crude oil futures traded on the NYMEX from the EIA (Energy Information
Agency). Crude oil futures can have maturities as long as 7 years. Contracts are for delivery
at Cushing, OK. Trading ends four days prior to the 25th calendar day preceding the delivery
month. If the 25th is not a business day, trading ends on the fourth business day prior to
the last business day before the 25th calendar day (see Alquist and Kilian, 2010). Given that
our fundamental variables are only available at a monthly frequency, we have to construct
monthly futures prices. A comment problem in constructing monthly futures prices of a given
maturity is that an h-month contract may not trade on a given day. In line with Alquist and
Kilian (2010) we identify the h-month futures contract trading closest to the last trading day
of the month and use the price associated with that contract as the end-of-month value. By
doing so, we obtain a continuous monthly time series based on a backward-looking window
of at most ve days. For maturities up to three months, the backward-looking window is at
most three days. This allows us to match up end-of-month spot prices and futures prices as
closely as possible. The daily spot price data are also obtained from the EIA and refer to the
price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil available for delivery at Cushing, OK.
Besides the futures and spot price of oil, we also need to include expected oil demand,
oil inventories and the risk free interest rate into our fundamental equation. For expected oil
demand, we take the total global oil demand projections by the IEA (International Energy
Agency) as published on a monthly basis in their monthly world oil market report. These
series are consistently available for the next quarter ahead since January 1992. To match19
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them to the oil price futures data, we take from the EIA the oil futures contract that have a
three month maturity. In our regressions, we incorporate the expected change in oil demand
between the current and next quarter. For oil inventories, we also take the data available
from the IEA. However, in this case, only OECD inventories for crude oil are available. For
non-OECD countries, this data is unfortunately not available. For the risk free interest rate,
we take the 10-year US government bond yield, which is often considered to be a risk free
rate (see Fleming, 2010).











Figure 4: Index of speculative activity for the period January 1992 - April 2011
For our transition equations, we need to model fundamental volatility (see equation 10).
In our case, we calculate the volatility of oil demand (as derived from the IEA’s monthly
world oil market report). Finally, our transition equation would require the share of non-
commercial traders in the oil futures market (see equation 10). One possible way to do
so would be to include the net open interest non-commercial positions from the CFTC’s
historical commitment of traders report. However, as noted by Working (1960), the level
of non-commercial trading is only meaningful in comparison with the level of hedging in
the market. Indeed, increased speculative positions naturally arise with increased hedging
pressures in the market. Hence, in order to assess the adequacy of speculative activity in the
crude oil market, relative to hedging activity, Working has suggested the following index:
W =
1+ QFV
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whereby  is non-commercial short positions, is non commercial long positions, 
is short hedge positions and is long hedge positions. To calculate the index, we rely on the
CFTC’s historical commitment of traders reports. These reports distinguish between non-
commercial and commercial traders. When using this data, it is important to note that (as
stated by the CFTC, 2008 page 2), the current data received by the CFTC classiﬁes positions
by entity (commercial versus noncommercial) and not by trading activity (speculation versus
hedging). These trader classiﬁcations have grown less precise over time, as both groups
may be engaging in hedging and speculative activity. Indeed, the behaviour of hedgers and
speculators is actually better described as a continuum between pure risk avoidance and pure
speculation. However, since no breakdown by trading activity is available, we will rely in our
a n a l y s i so nt h eC F T Cd a t as i n c ei ti st h eb e s tp r o x ya v a i l a b l ea tp r e s e n t .I no u rc a l c u l a t i o n s
we include information from the trading on the oil futures (and hence exclude oil options
from the series). The results of the calculations are presented in Chart 4. As can be seen,
until approximately end 2002, the index was stable with an average of around 1.15 suggesting
a level of speculation that is 15% in excess of what is minimally necessary to meet hedging
needs. Since early 2003 however, the index has initially increased steadily and in the course
of 2007 rapidly to reach a peak of almost 1.5.
Overall, the sample period for our estimation is determined by the availability of oil
demand projections by the IEA. As a result, the time-varying transition probability Markov-
switching model was estimated over the period January 1992 - April 2011. The estimated
parameter coeﬃcients from the model are presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Estimates of the markov switching model
Coeﬃcient estimates of the Markov-switching model
Fundamentalist equation Chartist equation
0 -25.00∗∗ 0 -1.89∗∗
1 0.96∗∗ 1 0.81∗∗
2 0.21∗∗ 2 0.07∗∗
3 -0.03∗ 3 0.08∗∗
4 0.01∗∗ 4 0.02∗∗
Time-varying transition probabilities estimates
Fundamentalist equation Chartist equation
0 0.31∗ 0 0.09∗∗
1 0.05∗ 1 0.10∗∗
2 50.53∗
Variance




Note: standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at a 10% level,∗∗ at a 5% level. Fundamentalist
equation: = 0 + 1()+2 + 3(+1)+4 + , Chartist equation:  = 0 +
1−1−1+2−1+3−1+4+, Fundamentalist equation: ( = |−1 =
)= (0+1(−1)2)
1+(0+1(−1)2), Chartist equation: ( = |−1 = )= (0+1−1+2)
1+(0+1−1+2)
The results indicate, that consistently with what we assumed in our theoretical model,
there exists a "fundamental-based " and "chartist-based " regime. In the fundamental21
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Transition probability, fundamental regime (Y-axis) - Deviation from fundamental based model (X-axis)







Transition probability, chartist regime (Y-axis), Deviation from chartist model (X-axis)







Transition probability, chartist regime (Y-axis), Detrended speculative position (X-axis)
Figure 5: Changes in the transition probabilities of the two estimated regimes for changes in
underlying parameters
based regime we nd that all explanatory variables are statistically signicant and enter the
regression with the sign as expected from the storage theory of oil as outlined in Pindyck
(1994). In more detail, oil spot prices, the 10-year government bond yield and oil stocks
are positively related to the oil futures prices. At the same time an increase in expected oil
demand results in a decline in oil futures prices. When considering the equations for the time-
varying transition probabilities, we nd that the probability of staying in the fundamental-
based regime increases stastically signicant as lagged oil futures prices deviate further from
underlying fundamentals. This is also shown in the top chart of Figure 5 (in the gure a
value closer to one indicates a higher probability of not switching regimes). The volatility of
oil demand did not enter the regression statistically signicant and the coe!cient was small.
Therefore it was dropped from the empirical model. In the case of the equation governing
the probability of remaining in the chartist regime, we nd that lagged deviations from the
chartist model indeed increase the probability of remaining in the chartist regime. This is
also shown in the middle chart of Figure 5. Moreover, in this equation we also nd that
the (detrended) speculative index enters the equation statistically signic a n ta n dw i t ht h e22
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expected sign: an increase of speculative activity increases the probability of remaining in the
chartist regime. This is re ected in the bottom chart of Figure 5.
The overall evolution of the transition probabilities is then shown in Figure 6. On average,
the probability of remaining the current regime is high in the fundamental regime (being on
average 0.86). In the chartist regime, the average probability is somewhat lower, being 0.53.
However, since 2004, the probability of remaining in the chartist regime has on average
clearly increased. This can most probably be attributed to the higher level of the detrended
speculative index in the latter part of the sample.
The variance estimates, as presented by the coe!cients 2
ixqg>w and 2
fkduw>w , show that
volatility is higher in the trend chasing than in the fundamental-based regime. A Hansen
likelihood ratio test also indicates that the dierence is statistically signicant. As such, this
result thus also conrms the outcome of theoretical model presented above.







Evolution of time-varying transition probabilities in the fundamental-based regime







Evolution of the time-varying transition probabilities in the chartist regime
Figure 6: The evolution of the time-varying transition probabilities over time
Finally, we can look at the smoothed probabilities to understand how likely at each mo-
ment in time the fundamental-based versus chartist regime prevailed. This is presented in
Chart 7. As can be seen in the chart, in the earlier period of our sample, namely between
January 1992 and January 2004, the fundamental-based regime has clearly prevailed. How-23
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ever, since then, several regime swithces have occurred and for most of the remaining sample
period, the chartist regime appears to have dominated market dynamics. This would suggest
that some speculative and trend chasing behaviour may have been adding to oil prices over
this period. Towards the very end of our estimation sample, however, the fundamental based
regime seem to re-emerge, however with a less than 100% certain probability.












Figure 7: Smoothed probability of being in the fundamental based regime
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we analysed the relative importance of fundamental and speculative demand on
oil futures price levels and volatility. In a rst step, we presented a theoretical heterogeneous
agent model of the oil futures market based on noise trading. Based on the theoretical model
we found that a multiplicity of equilibria can exist. More specically, on the one hand, if we
have high fundamental volatility, high uncertainty about future oil demand, and the oil price
deviation from fundamentals or the price trend is small, we will only have commercial traders
entering the market. On the other hand, if a large unexpected shock to the oil spot price
occurs then all traders will enter the market. In a next step, we empirically test the model by
estimating a markov-switching model with time-varying transition probabilities. We estimate
the model over the period January 1992 - April 2011. We nd that up to 2004, movements in
oil futures prices are best explained by underlying fundamentals. However, since 2004 regime
switching has become more frequent and the chartist regime has been the most prominent..24
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